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Strategic Dynamic Pricing with Network Effects
Ali Makhdoumi∗ Azarakhsh Malekian† Asuman Ozdaglar‡
Abstract
We study the optimal pricing strategy of a monopolist selling homogeneous goods
to n buyers over multiple periods. The customers choose their time of purchase to
maximize their payoff that depends on their valuation of the product, the purchase
price, and the utility they derive from past purchases of others, termed the network
effect. We first show that the optimal price sequence is non-decreasing. Therefore,
by postponing purchase to future rounds, customers trade-off a higher utility from
the network effects with a higher price. We then show that a customer’s equilibrium
strategy can be characterized by a threshold rule in which at each round a customer
purchases the product if and only if her valuation exceeds a certain threshold. This
implies that customers face an inference problem regarding the valuations of others,
i.e., observing that a customer has not yet purchased the product, signals that her
valuation is below a threshold. We consider a block model of network interactions,
where there are blocks of buyers (with size equal to constant fraction of total number
of buyers) subject to the same network effect. A natural benchmark, this model allows
us to provide an explicit characterization of the optimal price sequence asymptotically
as the number of agents goes to infinity, which notably is linearly increasing in time
with a slope that depends on the network effect through a scalar given by the sum of
entries of the inverse of the network weight matrix. Our characterization shows that
increasing the “imbalance” in the network defined as the difference between the in and
out degree of the nodes increases the revenue of the monopolist. We further study
the effects of price discrimination and show that in earlier periods monopolist offers
lower prices to blocks with higher Bonacich centrality to encourage them to purchase,
which in turn further incentivizes other customers to buy in subsequent periods.
1 Introduction
The benefits that users derive from various products such as digital products (e.g., com-
puter software and smartphone apps) and electronics (e.g., smartphones, hardware devices,
and computers) depend, among other things, on the other users who have purchased the
product before and thus have contributed to improvements of various aspects of the prod-
uct. User’s purchase decisions in settings with such externalities, termed network effects,
will focus on not just whether but when to make a purchase. This implies that a seller
will choose a dynamic price path for the product that aims to build the central early user
population to increase the network effects and the purchase possibility of the product in
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later periods. Despite the ubiquity of these issues, there is little work on dynamic pricing
with network effects.
In this paper, we study the problem of dynamic pricing in the presence of network
effects. We consider a dynamic game between a monopolist seller and a set of buyers.
All buyers and seller are forward-looking. The seller announces and commits to a price
sequence and buyers decide whether and when to buy a single item. The utility of each
buyer depends on her valuation of the product, the price sequence, and the (weighted)
number of other customers who have already bought the product. We first show that in this
setting the optimal price sequence is non-decreasing. We then show that the equilibrium
purchase decision of buyers (in Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium) can be characterized by a
threshold rule in which buyers purchase at different rounds if and only if their valuations
exceed a certain threshold. This characterization implies that customers face a learning
problem regarding the valuations of others since if a round has reached and a customer has
not yet purchased the item, her valuation must be below the threshold. Therefore, at any
round the belief of a customer regarding the valuations of the remaining customers gets
updated using Bayes’ rule. As the optimal price sequence is non-decreasing, by postponing
purchase to future rounds each buyer faces the following trade-off: on one hand, she has
to pay a higher price, and on the other hand, her utility from the network effects becomes
larger.
Building on this characterization, we find the optimal pricing strategy in a block model
setting. In particular, we consider a block model with m blocks such that each block h
has a constant fraction of the total number of buyers. The networks effects are captured
by a matrix E ∈ Rm×m, where Ehh′ denotes the network effect of a buyer in block h′
on a buyer in block h. This model provides a natural benchmark in which there are
blocks of users subject to the same network effect while still allowing diverse interactions
among these blocks. Different blocks may for example represent communities with different
characteristics (see Tirole (1988, Chapter 7) and Talluri and Van Ryzin (2006, Chapter
8)). Most importantly, this model allows us to write the seller’s expected revenue as a
multivariate Bernstein polynomial which enables us to use asymptotic convergence theory
of these polynomials and explicitly characterize the optimal price sequence (see Lorentz
(2012)).
Interestingly, for any distribution of buyers’ valuations (under some regularity condi-
tions) we find the closed-form solution of the optimal price sequence asymptotically as
the number of users goes to infinity. The optimal price sequence is linearly increasing,
and our characterization shows that the properties of both optimal price sequence and the
optimal revenue depend on the quantity 1/
(
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)
which we term the network effect.
In particular, the extent of the price difference at two consecutive rounds (slope of the
price path) is greater for higher network effect and the optimal revenue is increasing and
convex in network effect. The network effect (and hence the optimal revenue) is higher
for “imbalance” networks.1 More precisely, for a given sum of network effects (i.e., sum of
the entries of E), by decreasing sum of the multiplication of out-degree and in-degree of
blocks the revenue increases.
Moreover, we consider a setting with price discrimination, where monopolist offers dif-
ferent prices to different blocks, and characterize the optimal price sequence. We establish
that the optimal price sequence is linearly increasing with a slope which is in the form of
a “weighted Bonacich centrality”. Our results indicate that in earlier periods monopolist
1A directed network is called balance if for each node the out-degree and in-degree are equal.
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offers lower prices to blocks with higher centrality to encourage them to purchase, which
in turn further incentivizes other customers to buy at higher prices in the subsequent
periods. We also consider a variation of our model with utility from all purchases and
characterize the optimal price sequence and revenue.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper relates to two sets of works: (i) the study of markets with network effects and
(ii) the study of markets with forward-looking strategic buyers.
1.1.1 Network Externalities
Markets for products with network effects has been first studied in Rohlfs (1974), Katz and Shapiro
(1985), and Farrell and Saloner (1985). Given the importance of network effects in mar-
kets, empirical investigations have examined its implications in a variety of industries. In
particular, Au and Kauffman (2001) examine the adoption of electronic bill and payment
technology and show the existence of network effects and its implications, Gallaugher and Wang
(2002) empirically study the market for Web server software and establish the presence
of network effects, and Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) empirically study the network
effects in software product market and confirm that the network effects significantly has
increased the price of products.
Moreover, on the theory side, a line of research has examined the strategic and welfare
implications of network effects. In particular, Candogan et al. (2012), Cohen and Harsha
(2013), and Bloch and Que´rou (2013) study the optimal static price sequence of a seller
selling a divisible good (service) to consumers with network effects. They consider a
two-stage game in which a seller decides on the prices, and then buyers decide their
consumption in an equilibrium. Given a set of prices, their model takes the form of
a network game among agents that interact locally, which relates to a series of pa-
pers such as Ballester et al. (2006); Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007); Galeotti and Goyal
(2009), and Bramoulle´ et al. (2014). Related models are more recently investigated in
Fainmesser and Galeotti (2016), Alizamir et al. (2017), and Belloni et al. (2017). In par-
ticular, Alizamir et al. (2017) consider promotion planning of network products and study
the effect of network structure.
1.1.2 Strategic Buyers
A number of papers in the literature consider strategic forward-looking buyers who make
inter-temporal purchasing decisions with the goal of maximizing their utility. Many em-
pirical works confirm that assuming myopic customer behavior is no longer a tenable
assumption (see e.g. Li et al. (2014)). The importance of forward-looking customer be-
havior in shaping firms’ pricing decision has been broadly identified by practitioners and
a recent literature has theoretically studied its implications (see Liu and Van Ryzin (2008);
Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2011), Board and Skrzypacz (2016); Pai and Vohra (2013); Borgs et al.
(2014); Cachon and Feldman (2015); Chen and Farias (2015); Yang and Zhang (2015);
Lobel et al. (2015); Dilme and Li (2016); Bernstein and Mart´ınez-de Albe´niz (2016)). In
particular, Besbes and Lobel (2015) study the optimal price sequence of a committed
seller that faces customers arriving over time with heterogeneous willingness to wait be-
fore making a purchase. They show that cyclic pricing policies are optimal for this setting.
Ajorlou et al. (2016) consider a setting in which customers know about the existence of
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a product through the word-of-mouth communication and study the pricing strategy of
the seller. Papanastasiou and Savva (2016) consider a setting in which forward-looking
customers learn the quality (unknown and fixed) of a product from the reviews of their
peers and study the pricing strategy of the seller. Lingenbrink and Iyer (2018) consider
a setting with strategic customers and uncertain inventory and find the revenue-optimal
signaling mechanism (i.e., the signaling that “persuades” customers to purchase at higher
price).2
1.2 Notation
For any matrix M ∈ Rm×n, we use both [M ]ij and Mij to denote the entry at ith
row and jth column. We show vectors with bold face letters. For a matrix M , ρ(M)
and ||M ||∞ denote the spectral radius and infinity norm of M , defined as ρ(M) =
max{|λ| : λ is eigen value of M}, and ||M ||∞ = max1≤i≤m
∑n
j=1 |Mij |, respectively.
The vector of all ones is shown by 1, where the dimension of vector is clear from the
context. For any event E , 1{E} = 1 if E holds and 0, otherwise. For any integer n, we
let [n] = {1, . . . , n}. We denote the transpose of vector x and matrix M by xT and MT ,
respectively. For two vectors x,y ∈ Rm, x ≥ y means entry-wise inequality, i.e. xi ≥ yi,
for all i ∈ [m]. For two matrices A,B ∈ Rm×m, A ≥ B means entry-wise inequality,
i.e. Aij ≥ Bij, for all i, j ∈ [m]. We show a weighted directed network by (V,G) where
V = {1, . . . , n} represents the set of nodes and Gij represents the weight of the edge
from j to i. In-degree and out-degree of node i are denoted by d
(in)
i =
∑n
j=1Gij and
d
(out)
i =
∑m
j=1Gji. A network is called symmetric iff Gij = Gji for all i, j ∈ [n] and is
called balance iff d
(out)
i = d
(in)
i for all i ∈ [n]. We let P[0,1](·) denote the projection operator
onto the interval [0, 1].
1.3 Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2, 3, and 4 we describe the
model and provide preliminary characterizations of buyers and seller strategy. In Section
5 we characterize the optimal price sequence. In Section 6, we study the effects of net-
work structure on the optimal price sequence and optimal revenue. Finally, in Section 7
we characterize optimal price sequence with price discrimination, leading to concluding
remarks in Section 8. All of the omitted proofs as well as a variation of our model and
analysis are presented in the Appendix.
2 Model Description
We consider a dynamic game between a monopolist with infinitely many homogeneous
items and n buyers in T rounds. For our analysis, we find it more convenient to index the
rounds in decreasing order, i.e., round t refers to period T +1− t (there are t−1 remaining
periods until the end of selling horizon). The monopolist announces a price sequence
2Our paper also relates to the literature on the “Coase conjecture” Coase (1972); Gul et al. (1986).
“Coasian dynamics” (Hart and Tirole (1988)) consist of two properties: (i) higher valuation buyers make
their purchase no later than lower valuation buyers (skimming property) and (ii) equilibrium price sequence
is non-increasing over time (price monotonicity property). In this paper, we show that the second property
does not hold when network effects are present.
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p = (pT , pT−1, . . . , p1) where pt is the price offered for the item at round t. At each round,
buyers decide whether to buy the item or postpone it to future rounds. We let ht denote
the set of buyers that buy the item at round t at price pt. The history available to buyers
at round t is given by Ht = {hT+1, hT , . . . , ht+1} (we also let hT+1 = ∅). Each buyer has a
valuation v in [0, 1] drawn independently from a known continuous distribution Fv(·). The
utility of each buyer depends on her valuation, the price sequence, and a network effect
term. More specifically, we assume that buyer interactions are captured by a directed
weighted graph (V,G), where V = {1, . . . , n} is the set of buyers and G = [gij ]i,j∈V is a
weight matrix with gij ≥ 0 representing the utility gain i derives from j’s purchase (note
that gij can be different from gji). Thus, the utility of buyer i with valuation v
(i), if she
buys the item at round t with price pt is given by
ui
(
v,p,Ht
)
= v(i) − pt +
∑
j 6=i
gij1{j has bought at round s > t}, (2.1)
where v = (v(1), . . . , v(n)). The third term is the weighted sum of other buyers who have
bought the item before round t and represents the “network effect” on buyer i’s utility.
This utility model captures situations in which other buyers purchase decisions affect a
buyer’s utility by improving the product through their use. Hence, at the time a buyer
makes her purchase decision and utilizes the product, what matters is past users that
determine how improved the product is. Note that consistent with this interpretation
and full rationality (in perfect Bayesian equilibrium), even though buyers derive utility
from purchases in the past, they are forward-looking, i.e., they take into account all future
behavior and decide to postpone the purchase if it is optimal. In Appendix 8.1, we
consider a variation of our model with utility from all purchases (i.e., not only the previous
purchases). For this alternative model, we find the optimal price sequence and the optimal
revenue of the monopolist.
We next describe the buyers’ strategies. A given price sequence p = (pT , . . . , p1) in-
duces a dynamic incomplete information game among buyers. A (pure) strategy for buyer
i is a sequence {bti}Tt=1, where bti is a mapping from R×Ht×RT into {0, 1}, mapping buyer
i’s valuation, the history of the game, and the price sequence into a purchase decision.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a collection of strategies {bti}Tt=1, for i ∈ [n] such that
buyer i maximizes her expected utility given her belief (updated in a Bayesian manner)
and strategies of other buyers. In particular, in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium a buyer
i 6∈ Ht buys the item at round t with price pt if and only if
ui
(
v,p,Ht
) ≥ max
s<t
E
[
ui (v,p,H
s) | Ht] ,
where the left hand side is the utility of buyer i if she purchases at round t and the right
hand side is the maximum of expected utility from purchasing in any of the future rounds
(i.e., s < t). The expectation is taken over the belief of buyer i regarding the other buyers’
valuations.
For a given price sequence p, the expected revenue of the monopolist is3
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
ptE [1{i buys at round t with price pt}] , (2.2)
3We use the terms monopolist and seller interchangeably. We also use the terms user, customer, and
buyer interchangeably.
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where we normalized the marginal cost of the monopolist to zero. We refer to the price
sequence that maximizes Eq. (2.2) as the optimal price sequence and the corresponding
revenue as the optimal revenue (we also use the term optimal normalized revenue which
is equal to the optimal revenue divided by the number of buyers). The ability of the seller
to commit to a price sequence is important for our results. Without such commitment, a
Coase conjecture-type reasoning would create a downward pressure on prices and would
tend to reduce seller’s revenue (Coase (1972)). Though such commitment is not possible
in some settings, many sellers can build a reputation for such commitment, for instance,
by creating explicit early discounts which will be lifted later on (see Talluri and Van Ryzin
(2006, Chapter 8) for a discussion of committed pricing).
3 Preliminary Characterizations
In this section, we show the optimal price sequence is non-decreasing and characterize
the purchase decision of customers in equilibrium. Each buyer faces an optimal stopping
problem, choosing the round (if any) along a sequence of prices at which to accept the
offered price and exit the game given the strategy of other buyers. We next show that the
optimal price sequence is non-decreasing and buyer i chooses to purchase the item only
if her valuation exceeds a time and history dependent threshold denoted by v
(i)
t (H
t) that
satisfies v
(i)
t (H
t) ≥ v(i)t−1(Ht−1) for all Ht−1. In the rest of the paper, we use v(i)t (Ht) and
v
(i)
t interchangeably and refer to them as critical thresholds.
Proposition 1 (a) The seller’s optimal price sequence is non-decreasing, i.e., any op-
timal price sequence has a corresponding non-decreasing price sequence in which the
equilibrium path (the purchase decision of buyers) remains the same.
(b) Given a non-decreasing price sequence, the purchase decision of buyer i ∈ [n] in
any equilibrium is a thresholding decision, i.e., for each i there exists a sequence
{v(i)t }1t=T , such that v(i)t ≥ v(i)t−1 for 2 ≤ t ≤ T and buyer i purchases at round t if
and only if v(i) ≥ v(i)t .
Proposition 1 is a crucial observation on which much of the rest of our analysis builds.
Technically, it is simple and relates to previous results in dynamic settings with preferences
satisfying single crossing. Its implications in our model are far-reaching, however. Without
network effects, increasing (non-decreasing) price sequence would be impossible to sustain.
Because with increasing prices, high-valuation buyers will tend to be the first ones to
purchase, and if lower-valuation buyers prefer not to purchase early on (with low prices),
they would also prefer not to purchase later on with higher prices (as there is no benefit
from network effects). This phenomenon is transformed in the presence of network effects.
Now because the increase in the number of users over time raises the network effect term
(regardless of the exact form of network interactions), lower-valuation buyers might prefer
to buy later and at higher prices. In fact, it is not optimal for the seller to have a
strictly decreasing price sequence, because this would induce all buyers to delay, while
an increasing price sequence would induce high-valuation buyers to purchase early, while
lower-valuation ones wait and purchase once the network effect is higher.
In the next lemma we provide a relation for the critical thresholds describing the
buyers’ purchase decision.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the graph capturing the network effects used in Example 1 for
a = 45 and b =
3
5 .
Lemma 1 Given a non-decreasing price sequence p, for t = T, . . . , 1 the critical thresholds
satisfy the following indifference condition∑
j∈[n]\(Ht∪{i})
gijP
[
v(j) ≥ v(j)t | v(j) ≤ v(j)t+1
]
= pt−1 − pt, i 6∈ Ht, (3.1)
with v
(i)
T+1 = 1 for all i ∈ [n]. Moreover, if v(j)t ’s are in [0, 1], then we have
P
[
v(j) ≥ v(j)t | v(j) ≤ v(j)t+1
]
= 1−
Fv
(
v
(j)
t
)
Fv
(
v
(j)
t+1
) .
This relation is defined by noting that a buyer i with valuation equal to v
(i)
t must be
indifferent between buying at round t and waiting until round t− 1.
The sequence {v(i)t }1t=T+1, i ∈ [n] depends on the history of the game and Lemma
1 provides an indifference condition for it, with boundary conditions v
(i)
T+1 = 1, i ∈ [n].
This is because in the first period, the seller and buyers have not yet learned anything
about buyer i’s valuation. Note that each buyer faces an inference problem regarding the
valuation of the other buyers. In particular, if round t with history Ht is reached and a
buyer j has not purchased the item, then all buyers know that v(j) belongs to [0, v
(j)
t ) with
cumulative density function
P
[
v(j) ≤ x | Ht
]
=
Fv(x)
Fv(v
(j)
t )
, ∀x ∈
[
0, v
(j)
t
)
,
which is obtained via Bayes’ rule.
In the next example, we illustrate two main challenges in analyzing the equilibrium of
this game. First, we illustrate that finding the optimal price sequence is a complicated
task because the monopolist needs to take into account all possible histories (i.e., (T +1)n
histories for a game with n buyers in T rounds). Second, we illustrate the possibility of
having multiple equilibria.
Example 1 We consider a game with 3 buyers in 2 periods (n = 3 and T = 2) where the
network effects are represented by
G =
(
0 a 0
b 0 b
0 a 0
)
,
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for a = 4/5 and b = 3/5 (see Figure 1). We also let the valuations to be uniform, i.e.,
Fv(x) = x, for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Given a non-decreasing price sequence (p2, p1), if the critical
thresholds are in (0, 1), using Lemma 1 for the first period (i.e., t = 2) leads to
v
(1)
2 − p2 = v(1)2 − p1 + a(1− v(2)2 ), v(3)2 − p2 = v(3)2 − p1 + a(1− v(2)2 ),
v
(2)
2 − p2 = v(2)2 − p1 + b
((
1− v(1)2
)
+
(
1− v(3)2
))
,
where we used v
(i)
3 = 1, i = 1, 2, 3. This set of equations have multiple solutions, leading
to multiple strategies for the first period of the game. In particular, the critical thresholds
satisfy
v
(2)
2 = 1−
p1 − p2
a
, v
(2)
2 + v
(3)
2 = 2−
p1 − p2
a
. (3.2)
Using Lemma 1 for the second period (i.e., t = 1), we have
v
(1)
1 = p1 − a1{2 bought at price p2}, v(3)1 = p1 − a1{2 bought at price p2},
v
(2)
1 = p1 − b (1{1 bought at price p2}+ 1{3 bought at price p2}) . (3.3)
Given any set of critical thresholds, the expected revenue becomes
∑
S⊆{1,2,3}
(∏
i∈S
P
[
v(i) ≥ v(i)2
])p2|S|+ p1

 ∑
i∈{1,2,3}\S
P
[
v(i) ≥ v(i)1 | H2 = S
]

 , (3.4)
where the expectation is taken over all histories for H2 (8 possible histories). The first
term p2|S| is the revenue in the first period and the second term is the expected revenue
in the second period, given H2. Maximizing the expected revenue subject to Eqs. (3.2)
and (3.3), leads to the following pairs (among many others) of price sequence and buyers’
strategies:
• Symmetric equilibrium: in this equilibrium the buyers’ decision depend on their
valuation, price, and the network effects, and not on their identity. Therefore, the
strategies of buyers 1 and 3 are the same, i.e., v
(1)
1 = v
(3)
1 and v
(1)
2 = v
(3)
2 which leads
to price sequence p1 = .6 and p2 = .48 with expected revenue .38. The corresponding
buyers’ strategies in the first period are determined by critical thresholds v
(2)
2 =
1− (p1 − p2)/a, v(1)2 = v(3)2 = 1 − (p1 − p2)/2b, and in the second period by critical
thresholds given in Eq. (3.3). Note that all these critical thresholds are in (0, 1).
• Asymmetric equilibrium: suppose the buyers’ strategies in the first period are de-
termined by critical thresholds v
(2)
2 = 1 − (p1 − p2)/a, v(1)2 = 1 − (p1 − p2)/3b,
v
(3)
2 = 1− 2(p1 − p2)/3b. The optimal price sequence becomes p1 = .6 and p2 = .42
with expected revenue .52. The buyers’ strategies in the second period are deter-
mined by critical thresholds given in Eq. (3.3). Note that again all these critical
thresholds are in (0, 1).
To overcome the challenges illustrated in Example 1 and to obtain a tractable expected
revenue, we will consider a block model as described in the next section and focus on
the symmetric equilibrium concept. Intuitively, with this setting the sample equilibrium
path is close to its expectation which enables us to use techniques from probability theory
(namely, Bernstein polynomial convergence; see Lorentz (2012)) to find a closed-form
characterization for the expected revenue as well as the optimal price sequence.
8
4 The Block Model and Buyers’ Equilibrium
We consider a “block model” (first introduced in White et al. (1976); Holland et al. (1983))
in which the buyers are partitioned into m blocks. Block k ∈ [m] denoted by Gk has
nk = αkn many buyers for some αk ∈ (0, 1]. We let A ∈ Rm×m be a diagonal matrix with
Aii = αi. The utility gains of buyers in block h from purchase decision of buyers in block
k are equal and denoted by Ehk. Hence we can capture all the gains by a network matrix
E ∈ Rm×m. Formally, we let
gij =
Ekh
n
, i ∈ Gk, j ∈ Gh, k, h ∈ [m], k 6= h,
gij =
Ekk
n
, i, j ∈ Gk, k ∈ [m],
where the normalization by n is to guarantee that the network effects term in buyers’
utilities does not grow with n and is comparable to valuations which are in [0, 1]. For
instance, if lh ∈ [0, αhn] many buyers from block h purchase the product, then the network
effects of a buyer inGk is
∑
h∈[m]Ekh
lh
n
. This model provides a natural benchmark in which
there are blocks of users subject to the same network effect while still allowing diverse
interactions among these blocks. These blocks may for example represent communities
with dense linkages within themselves. Most importantly, this model allows us to write
the monopolist’s expected revenue as a multivariate Bernstein polynomial which enables
us to use convergence results of these polynomials and explicitly characterize the optimal
price sequence.
The following provides the definition and convergence of multivariate Bernstein poly-
nomial (see Lorentz (2012, Chapter 2.9)).
Definition 1 (Multivariate Bernstein Polynomial) For any function f : ∆k → R,
where ∆k = {x ∈ Rk : xi ≥ 0, i ∈ [k],
∑k
i=1 xi ≤ 1} is k-dimensional simplex, multivariate
Bernstein polynomial is defined as
Bf,n(x1, . . . , xk) =
∑
ri≥0,i∈[k]∑k
i=1 ri≤n
f
(r1
n
, . . . ,
rk
n
)( n
r1, . . . , rk
)
xr11 · · · xrkk (1− x1 − · · · − xk)n−r1−···−rk ,
where (
n
r1, . . . , rk
)
=
n!
r1! . . . rk!(n− r1 − · · · − rk)! .
Theorem 1 (Lorentz (2012)) If f : ∆k → R is continuous, then we have Bf,n → f
uniformly.
As shown in Example 1 there exist multiple equilibria for buyers’ purchase decisions;
however, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in which a buyer’s strategy depends
on her valuation and her network effects, not on her identity. In the rest of the paper,
we use the symmetric equilibrium concept and refer to it as buyers’ equilibrium.4 Using
Lemma 1, the buyers’ equilibrium is characterized by critical thresholds defined for blocks
described in the next corollary.
4Symmetric equilibrium is used as a selection device among multiple equilibria which is widely used
in the literature. See Gul et al. (1986), Chen (2012), Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2011) for dynamic pricing
settings, Krishna (2009, Chapter 4) for auction setting, and (Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2006, Chapter 8) for
pricing games.
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Corollary 1 (Buyers’ Equilibrium) Given a non-decreasing price sequence p, for t =
T, . . . , 1 the critical thresholds satisfy the following indifference condition
∑
k∈[m]
|Gk \Ht | Ehk
n
P
[
v ≥ v(k)t | v ≤ v(k)t+1
]
= pt−1 − pt, h ∈ [m], (4.1)
with v
(h)
T+1 = 1 for all h ∈ [m]. Moreover, in the buyers’ equilibrium any remaining buyer
in block Gh purchases at price pt if and only if her valuation exceeds v
(h)
t .
5 Optimal Price Sequence
In this section, we characterize the optimal price sequence for any valuation distribution
Fv(·) and network effects E under the following regularity conditions.
Assumption 1 Matrix E is invertible and the distribution Fv(·) is such that
x− 1− Fv(x)
fv(x)
− Fv(x)
1TE−11
is non-decreasing. Also, the matrix E is such that 0 ≤ (EA)−1 1 ≤ (1TE−11)1.
The assumption on Fv(·) is the analogous of the regularity condition (i.e., x− 1−Fv(x)fv(x) is
non-decreasing) and is used to guarantee the uniqueness of the optimal price sequence.
Indeed, without network effect (i.e., with E = 0) this assumption reduces to the regularity
condition which is used in optimal auction design (see Myerson (1981)). The assumptions
on the network matrix E guarantee that the critical thresholds are interior (i.e., in (0, 1))
and therefore enable their explicit characterization. As an example, we next show that for
uniform valuations and a weakly-tied block model, i.e., E = I+δC, for small δ, Assumption
1 holds. This network matrix captures situations in which inter block interactions are weak.
Lemma 2 Suppose E = I + δC with C ≥ 0. If δ < 1
21TC1
, then Assumption 1 holds for
uniform valuations and αi =
1
m
, for i ∈ [m].
Our key result presented next provides an explicit characterization of optimal prices
and optimal revenue as a function of the network effects.
Theorem 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. The optimal price sequence in the limit (as
n→∞) is given by
pt = (T − t) 1− Fv(pT )
T (1TE−11)
+ pT , t = 1, . . . , T, (5.1)
where pT is the solution of
pT = (1− Fv(pT ))
(
1
fv(pT )
− T − 1
T
1
1TE−11
)
.
In addition, the optimal normalized revenue is
pT (1− Fv(pT )) + T − 1
2T
1
1TE−11
(1− Fv(pT ))2 . (5.2)
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Proof We provide the main steps of the proof for T = 2 and uniform valuations. The
complete proof is presented in the Appendix.
We first characterize the buyers’ equilibrium given a price sequence as a function of
network matrix E and then find the optimal price sequence. Using Corollary 1, the
indifference condition for any block h ∈ [m] in the first period becomes
v
(h)
2 − p2 = v(h)2 − p1 +
∑
k∈[m]
Ehk
n
E

∑
i∈Gk
1{i buys at p2}

 = v(h)2 − p1 + ∑
k∈[m]
Ehkαk(1− v(k)2 ),
where we used uniform distribution for valuations in the last equality. By letting v2 =
(v
(1)
2 , . . . , v
(m)
2 ) and using the definition of A and E, we can write this equation in compact
form as
v2 = 1− (EA)−1 1(p1 − p2). (5.3)
In the second period, any remaining buyer i in block Gh buys the item if and only if
v(i) − p1 +
∑
k∈[m]
∑
j∈Gk
Ehk
n
1{v(j) ≥ v(k)2 } ≥ 0,
which for uniform valuations happens with probability
P[0,1]

1− p1 −
∑
k∈[m]
∑
j∈Gk
Ehk
n
1{v(j) ≥ v(k)2 }
v
(h)
2

 .
Therefore, the monopolist’s expected revenue can be written as
∑
1≤kh≤nh
(
m∏
h=1
(
nh
kh
)
(1− v
(h)
2 )
kh(v
(h)
2 )
nh−kh
)(
p2
m∑
h=1
kh + p1
m∑
h=1
(nh − kh)P[0,1]
(
1−
p1 −
∑
h′∈[m] Ehh′
k
h′
n
v
(h)
2
))
,
(5.4)
where the first term of each summand is the probability of a multivariate Binomial
random variable capturing the probability of the event that in the first period for each
block h ∈ [m], kh out of nh many buyers purchase the item. The second term of each
summand is the expected revenue of the monopolist given this event. In particular, for each
block h, kh buyers purchase the product at price p2 and each of the remaining (nh − kh)
buyers purchase the product at price p1 with probability P[0,1]
(
1− p1−
∑
h′∈[m] Ehh′
k
h′
n
v
(h)
2
)
.
To obtain a closed-form expression for the optimal expected revenue, we consider the
limiting normalized revenue as n → ∞ and then use Bernstein polynomial convergence
presented in Theorem 1. Letting
f
(
k1
n1
, . . . ,
km
nm
)
=

p2 m∑
h=1
kh
nh
αh + p1
∑
h∈[m]
(
1− kh
nh
)
αhP[0,1]

1− p1 −
∑
h′∈[m]Ehh′αh′
kh′
nh′
v
(h)
2



 ,
the normalized expected revenue given in Eq. (5.4) becomes
∑
1≤kh≤nh
(
m∏
h=1
(
nh
kh
)
(1− v(h)2 )kh(v(h)2 )nh−kh
)
f
(
k1
n1
, . . . ,
km
nm
)
.
11
Therefore, using Theorem 1 the limiting normalized revenue becomes
p2
m∑
h=1
αh(1− v(h)2 ) +
∑
h
p1(αh − (1− v(h)2 )αh)P[0,1]
(
1− p1 −
∑
h′ Ehh′(1− v(h
′)
2 )αh′
v
(h)
2
)
= p2 + (p1 − p2)(αTv2)− p21 + p1αT (EA) (1− v2), (5.5)
where the second equality follows from Assumption 1 and Eq. (5.3), as we will show at
the end of this proof. Combining Eqs. (5.3) and (5.5), the normalized limiting revenue
denoted by h(p1, p2) becomes
h(p1, p2) = p2 + (p1 − p2)
(
αT
(
1− (EA)−1 1(p1 − p2)
))
− p21 + p1αT1(p1 − p2)
= p1 −
(
1TE−11
)
(p1 − p2)2 − p1p2.
We next find (p1, p2) that maximizes h(p1, p2). The first order conditions of h(p1, p2) are
∂h(·)
∂p1
= 1− 2(p1 − p2)
(
1TE−11
) − p2 = 0, ∂h(·)
∂p2
= 2(p1 − p2)
(
1TE−11
)− p1 = 0,
which leads to
p1 =
2
(
1TE−11
)
4 (1TE−11)− 1 , p2 =
2
(
1TE−11
)− 1
4 (1TE−11)− 1 . (5.6)
The solution of the first order conditions indeed lead to the maximum of h(p1, p2). We
can see this by taking second order derivative of h(p1, p2) and showing that the Hessian
is negative semidefinite. In particular, taking second order derivative of h(p1, p2) leads to
the following Hessian
M =

 −2
(
1TE−11
)
2
(
1TE−11
)− 1
2
(
1TE−11
)− 1 −2 (1TE−11)

 ,
which is negative definite. This can be seen by noting that M11 < 0 and det(M) =
4
(
1TE−11
)− 1 > 0, which holds because Assumption 1 for uniform distributions guaran-
tees 1TE−11 ≥ 12 .5 Therefore, the maximum of h(p1, p2) is attained at the solution of the
first order conditions. Plugging p1 and p2 from Eq. (5.6) in h(p1, p2), the optimal revenue
becomes (
1TE−11
)
4 (1TE−11)− 1 .
Finally, we show that the prices p1 and p2 and their corresponding v2 guarantee 1 −
p1−
∑
h′ Ehh′(1−v(h
′)
2 )αh′
v
(h)
2
∈ [0, 1] for all h ∈ [m], showing that the projection operators used
in Eq. (5.5) are identity. This is equivalent to
0 ≤ p1 −
∑
h′
Ehh′(1− v(h
′)
2 )αh′ ≤ v(h)2 , for all h ∈ [m]. (5.7)
5A symmetric 2× 2 matrix M is negative definite if M11 < 0 and det(M) > 0.
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Figure 2: (a) optimal normalized revenue as a function of the number of rounds for uniform
distribution and various network effects Ψ(E) and (b) optimal price sequence for uniform
distribution, T = 20, and various network effects Ψ(E).
Using Eq. (5.3), we can rewrite Eq. (5.7) in vector form as 0 ≤ p11−(EA) (1− v2)1 ≤ v2.
The lower bound evidently holds as p11 − (EA) (1− v2) = p21 ≥ 0. The upper bound
after plugging in p2 and p1 in Eq. (5.3) and finding v2, becomes
2
(
1TE−11
)− 1
4 (1TE−11)− 1 1 ≤ 1− (EA)
−1 1
1
4 (1TE−11)− 1 ,
which holds because of Assumption 1 and in particular (EA)−1 1 ≤ (1TE−11)1. This
completes the proof for the special case of T = 2 and uniform valuations.
Theorem 2 shows that the optimal price sequence is linearly increasing. Moreover, the
impact of the network matrix on the optimal price sequence and the optimal revenue is
captured by a single network measure 1
1TE−11
.
Definition 2 We refer to the term 1
1TE−11
as network effect and denote it by Ψ(E).
We next show the properties of the optimal normalized revenue as well as the optimal
price sequence as a function of the network effect and the number of rounds.
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. The optimal normalized revenue is increas-
ing in T and increasing and convex in network effect Ψ(E). Moreover, the slope of the
optimal price sequence (i.e., the difference of the optimal prices in two consecutive rounds)
is increasing in Ψ(E).
Theorem 2 and Proposition 2 yield the following insights:
• Proposition 2 shows that the optimal normalized revenue is an increasing convex
function in network effect. Intuitively, this holds because increasing Ψ(E) increases
the utility of buyers in two different ways: (i) direct effect : as Ψ(E) increases, keeping
purchase probability of other buyers the same, each buyer enjoys a higher network
effect, and (ii) indirect effect : as Ψ(E) increases, the purchase probability of other
buyers in previous rounds increases (i.e., the critical thresholds decrease), leading to
higher utility.
• Figure 2a shows the optimal normalized revenue as a function of the number of
rounds, illustrating that the optimal revenue is increasing in T . The optimal revenue
approaches the limiting normalized revenue as T →∞ relatively fast. For instance,
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for uniform valuations if we want to obtain q = 95% of the optimal revenue (i.e.,
revenue of infinitely many rounds), then for Ψ(E) = 15 , T = 3 rounds suffice and for
Ψ(E) = 45 , T = 13 rounds suffice.
• Figure 2b shows the optimal price sequence for various network effects, illustrating
that the slope of the optimal price sequence is increasing in Ψ(E). Proposition
2 shows the slope of the optimal price sequence is increasing in the network effect.
Intuitively, this holds because as Ψ(E) increases, the past purchases contribute more
to the utility of buyers, incentivizing them to purchase at a higher price.
• Buyers with valuations below the critical threshold of the last period v1 do not buy
the item. This threshold is decreasing in Ψ(E) and T . Therefore, increasing Ψ(E)
or T increases the number of users who purchase the item.
6 Aggregate Network Effect
In Theorem 2 we characterized the optimal price sequence as a function of the network
effect Ψ(E). We now study in more detail the effect of network properties on Ψ(E) and
the optimal price sequence and revenue. In this regard, we consider a weakly-tied block
model, where E = I + δC for C ≥ 0 and some sufficiently small δ ≥ 0. This network
matrix represents a natural setting in which the utility gain of buyers within each block is
larger than the ones across blocks. Also, note that for this network matrix, using Lemma
2, for uniform valuations and A = 1
m
I, Assumption 1 and therefore Theorem 2 holds. In
particular, a second order Taylor approximation of Ψ(E) leads to
1
m
+ δ
1TC1
m2
+ δ2
(
1TC1
)2 −m1TC21
m3
. (6.1)
Proposition 2 together with Eq. (6.1) leads to the following implications.
• The second term shows that higher sum of inter blocks utility gains, i.e, 1TC1, leads
to higher Ψ(E) and therefore higher revenue.
• The third term shows that for a given 1TC1, the highest revenue is obtained for a
network with the minimum 1TC21 where
1TC21 =
m∑
i,j=1
m∑
k=1
CikCkj =
m∑
i,k=1
Cikd
(out)
k =
m∑
k=1
d
(out)
k d
(in)
k .
Here d
(out)
k and d
(in)
k correspond to the out-degree and in-degree in the network matrix
C, respectively. This shows that the highest revenue is obtained for a network with
minimum
∑
k d
(out)
k d
(in)
k . With a small
∑
k d
(out)
k d
(in)
k , the influential blocks (i.e.,
with high out-degrees) are less influenced by other blocks (i.e., have low in-degrees).
Therefore, the influential blocks have little incentive to postpone their purchase
and prefer to purchase earlier (i.e., they have a low critical threshold). This in
turn incentivizes users from other blocks to purchase at higher prices in subsequent
periods (because of the higher network effect term), increasing the revenues of the
monopolist. As an example, for C ∈ {0, 1}m×m (i.e., Cij = 1 if there exists an edge
from j to i), a bipartite directed graph has the highest revenue (d
(in)
i d
(out)
i = 0 for
all i ∈ [m]).
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Figure 3: The normalized revenue as function of the number of periods for the networks
of Example 2: directed chain, directed ring, and directed star networks.
We next show that the minimum
∑m
k=1 d
(out)
k d
(in)
k (for a given in-degree sequence or
fixed 1TC1) is obtained for a network with the most degree sequence “imbalance”,
where the imbalance sequence is defined as (d
(in)
1 − d(out)1 , . . . , d(in)m − d(out)m ) (see
Mubayi et al. (2001)).
Proposition 3 Consider two network matrices C and C˜ with the same in-degree se-
quence d
(in)
1 ≥ · · · ≥ d(in)m and different out-degree sequences denoted by (c(out)1 , . . . , c(out)m )
and (c˜
(out)
1 , . . . , c˜
(out)
m ), respectively. If the imbalance sequence of C majorizes the im-
balance sequence of C˜, then 1TC21 ≤ 1T C˜21.6
The next example illustrates the effect of imbalance sequence on revenue by com-
paring the revenues of a directed chain, a directed ring, and a directed star network.
Example 2 We consider a directed chain, a directed ring, and a directed star
network (where the edges are from the periphery nodes to the center node) with
m = 10 blocks. For all of these networks we let the network matrix be E = I + δC,
δ = .29,
∑
i,j Cij = 30, and the weight of different edges in each network be the
same. The first and second terms of Eq. (6.1) are the same for these three networks,
but the third terms are different. In particular, the term
∑m
k=1 d
(out)
k d
(in)
k for directed
ring, directed chain, and directed star are 81.8, 81, and 0, respectively. Therefore,
the network effect and the revenue of directed star is higher than directed chain,
which is higher than directed ring. Figure 3 illustrates the revenues of these three
networks as a function of the number of periods.
• For a given 1TC1, among balanced networks for which d(in)k = d(out)k , for all k ∈ [m]
(note that a symmetric network, i.e., Cij = Cji is balanced) the highest revenue is
obtained by a regular network, i.e., a network with d
(out)
j = d
(out)
k for all j, k ∈ [m].
This follows because we have
1TC21 =
m∑
i,k=1
Cik

 m∑
j=1
Ckj

 = m∑
k=1
(
doutk
)2 ≥ 1
m
(
m∑
k=1
doutk
)2
,
6We say a sequence (a1, . . . , am) majorizes (b1, . . . , bm) if and only if for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m we have∑i
j=1 ai ≥
∑i
j=1 bi.
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where we used the balancedness in the last equality and Cauchy-Schwarz in the
inequality. The inequality becomes an equality if and only if for any k, we have
d
(out)
k =
1
m
∑m
i,j=1Cij , showing that a regular network has the highest revenue. Here,
because of the balancedness, each block is equally influential and influenced by oth-
ers. Now suppose the network is not regular and consider the block with the highest
out-degree (which is equal to its in-degree). The customers in this block have a high
in-degree and therefore prefer to postpone their purchase to future rounds (because
they will obtain a large utility gain from other purchases). Thus, the monopolist
cannot fully utilize the network effect of this block on other blocks to increase the
revenue.
7 Price Discrimination
In this section, we study price discrimination and characterize the optimal price sequence.
With price discrimination, at each round the price offered to different blocks can be differ-
ent. Throughout this section we assume that the valuations are uniform, but, the results
can be generalized to any valuation distribution under proper regularity assumptions.
Proposition 4 Suppose the valuations are uniform and I − EA is positive semidefinite.
The optimal price sequence in the limit (as n→∞) is given by
pt =
T − t
T
(
I − T − 1
T
EA
)−1
EApT + pT , t = T, . . . , 1, (7.1)
where pT is the solution of
pT =
1
2
1− T − 1
4T
(
I − T − 1
2T
EA
)−1
EA1. (7.2)
Note that for a symmetric weakly-tied block model, i.e., E = I + δC, similar to Lemma
2, for small enough δ, Assumption 1 holds.
We can rewrite the optimal price sequence as
pt =
T − t
T − 1b
(
EA,
T − 1
2T
)
− 1
T − 11+ pT , t = T, . . . , 1,
where b(E, β) is the Bonacich centrality with parameter β in network E defined as
b(E, β) = (I − βE)−1 1 (see Bonacich (1987)). Proposition 4 establishes that the op-
timal price sequence is linear and the slope of this linear price sequence is given by a
“weighted Bonacich centrality”. This implies that in the early periods the monopolist
offers a lower price to more central blocks and rapidly increases the price offered to them
in subsequent periods. This is to encourage more central buyers to purchase in the early
periods which in turn incentivizes more buyers (due to larger centrality) to purchase in
subsequent periods.
We next compare the optimal price sequence in this setting with that of the static
pricing studied in Candogan et al. (2012). The buyer’s strategies in a setting with one
round of pricing is given by a threshold rule where buyers in block i purchase the item if
their valuation exceed v(i). These thresholds satisfy the indifference condition
v − p+ EA (1− v) = 0,
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where v =
(
v(1), . . . , v(m)
)
. This leads to v = (I − EA)−1 (p− EA1).7 Therefore, the
normalized revenue becomes
pTA (1− v) = pTA (I − EA)−1 1− pTA (I − EA)−1 p. (7.3)
Maximizing Eq. (7.3) over p leads to
p = 1− 1
2
(I − EA)
(
I − EA+ (EA)
T
2
)−1
1, (7.4)
which is the same as the optimal prices obtained for static pricing in Candogan et al. (2012,
Theorem 2) with G = EA. Comparing our result in Proposition 4 and Eq. (7.4), we note
that the optimal price given in Eq. (7.4) for symmetric networks (i.e., EA = (EA)T ) is
p = 121 (see also Candogan et al. (2012, Corollary 1)). However, in our setting with more
than one period, even for symmetric networks, the optimal price sequence depends on the
network structure (see Eqs. (7.1) and (7.2)) and the monopolist obtains revenue gains
from the network effects which is in sharp contrast with Candogan et al. (2012, Section
5).
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8 Conclusion
We study the problem of finding the optimal price sequence for a product given a set of
customers with heterogeneous valuations that strategically decide their purchase time (if
any). The product features network effects, i.e., the utility of each customer depends on
the price sequence, her valuation, as well as a weighted number of other buyers who have
purchased the item. We establish that the problem of finding the optimal price sequence is
a tractable one and explicitly characterize the optimal price sequence as a function of the
network structure. Our main result identifies a novel dependence on the network struc-
ture: sum of the entries of the inverse of network matrix, termed network effect. From
a structural perspective, the optimal price sequence is always linearly increasing with a
slope that is increasing in the network effect. We establish that increasing network im-
balance increases the network effect which, in turn, increases the revenue. The framework
and results we present in this paper lay the ground for a potential new approach to the
class of dynamic pricing problems with strategic customers and combinatorial structures.
Avenues for future research include the expansion of the set of problems that may be
tackled through the present approach. For example, the question of dynamic strategic
pricing with limited inventory and strategic buyers and seller is a natural extension.
7For any k ∈ [m] the expected normalized number of customers in block k who purchase the item is
1− v(k). Therefore, our model becomes identical to the consumption model of Candogan et al. (2012) by
letting the “consumption level” of block k be equal to 1− v(k).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of part (a): if ps+1 > ps for some s = T − 1, . . . , 1, then none of the buyers
will buy the item at round s + 1 (note that the period with price ps is after the period
with price ps+1). This is because if they wait until the next round, the price decreases
and the network effect term of their utility weakly increases (it either remains the same
or increases). Therefore, the equilibrium path (the purchase decision of buyers) in the
continuation game (i.e., in rounds s+ 1, s, . . . , 1) is the same as a game in which we have
ps = ps+1. Staring from the last period (i.e., s = 1) and repeatedly applying this argument
shows the existence of a non-decreasing price sequence with the same equilibrium path as
the optimal price sequence.
Proof of part (b): for a given equilibrium, suppose that buyer i with valuation v finds
it optimal to purchase at price pt in round t. Then it must be the case that her utility
from purchasing in round t is not smaller than her expected utility from postponing the
purchase to future rounds (i.e., not purchasing at round t). Therefore, we must have
v − pt +
∑
j
gij1{j bought at s > t}
≥ E

 1∑
s=t−1
1{i buy at price ps}

v − ps +∑
j
gij1{j bought at s′ > s}

 | Ht


=
1∑
s=t−1
P [i buys at s]

v − ps + E

∑
j
gij1{j bought at s′ > s} | Ht



 .
Since
∑0
s=t−1 P [i buys at s] ≤ 1 (there is a probability with which i does not buy at all),
the derivative in v of the left hand side of this inequality is at least as large as that of the
right hand side. Therefore, buyer i with valuations v′ > v finds it strictly optimal to also
purchase at round t with price pt. This shows that if buyer i at time t does not purchase,
then her valuation is larger than a certain threshold denoted by v
(i)
t . Finally, note that
each buyer that purchases the item leaves the game, leading to v
(i)
t ≥ v(i)t−1, for 2 ≤ t ≤ T .
Proof of Lemma 1
Using Proposition 1, for a given price sequence pT , . . . , p1 and history H
t, the decision
of buyer i ∈ [n] at time t is to buy if and only if her valuation exceeds v(i)t . Buyer
i with valuation v
(i)
t must be indifferent between accepting price pt and waiting until
the subsequent round (in a continuation game with t − 1 periods to go). If buyer i
with valuation v
(i)
t purchases at price pt, her utility (conditional on period t having been
reached) is
v
(i)
t − pt +
∑
j
gij1{j has bought at s > t}. (8.1)
By waiting one more period instead, buyer i with valuation v
(i)
t obtains utility
v
(i)
t − pt−1 +
∑
j
gijE [1{j has bought at s > t− 1}] . (8.2)
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Buyer i with threshold v
(i)
t at round t must be indifferent between buying at round t and
buying at the next round, i.e., round t− 1. Subtracting Eq. (8.1) and Eq. (8.2) leads to
v
(i)
t − pt = v(i)t − pt−1 +
∑
j∈[n]\Ht\{i}
gijP [j buys at round t] ,
where
P [j buys at round t] = P
[
v(j) ≥ v(j)t | v(j) ≤ v(j)t+1
]
,
Finally, note that if v
(j)
t+1 = 0, then buyer j has purchased the item in round t+ 1 and if
v
(j)
t+1 ∈ (0, 1], then using Bayes’ rule we have
P
[
v(j) ≥ v(j)t | v(j) ≤ v(j)t+1
]
= 1−
Fv
(
v
(j)
t
)
Fv(v
(j)
t+1)
,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of (EA)−11 ≥ 0: we will show that E−11 ≥ 0. First note that since ρ(C) ≤
||C||∞ ≤ 1TC1, we have δρ(C) < 1 which guarantees I+δC is invertible. Since δρ(C) < 1,
we also have
E−11 =
(
I − δC + δ2C2 − . . . )1 = (I + δ2C2 + . . . ) (1− δC1) ≥ 1− δC1 ≥ 0,
where the last two inequalities follow from δ||C||∞ ≤ 1.
Proof of (EA)
−1
1
1TE−11
≤ 1: using Taylor series expansion of (I + δC)−1 (which converges
because δρ(C) < 1), leads to
1T (I + δC)−1 1 ≥ 1T (I − δC) 1 = m− δ (1TC1) . (8.3)
We also have
E−11 =
(
I − δC + δ2C − δ3C3 + . . . )1 = (I − δC + δ2C)1− (δ2C2 + δ4C4 + . . . ) (I − δC) 1
(1)
≤ (I − δC + δ2C)1 (2)≤ 1, (8.4)
where inequality (1) follows from δ||C||∞ < 1 and inequality (2) follows from δC21 ≤ C1.
This inequality holds because for any i ∈ [m] we have
δ
m∑
j=1
[C2]ij = δ
m∑
j=1
m∑
k=1
CijCkj = δ
m∑
k=1
Cik
m∑
j=1
Ckj ≤ δ||C||∞
m∑
k=1
Cik ≤
m∑
k=1
Cik.
Putting Eqs. (8.3) and (8.4) together leads to
(EA)−1 1
1TE−11
≤ mE
−11
m− δ1TC1 ≤
m1
m− δ1TC1 ≤ 1,
where we used δ1TC1 ≤ m in the last inequality that follows from δ||C||∞ ≤ 1.
Proof of x− 1−Fv(x)
fv(x)
− Fv(x)
1TE−11
non-decreasing: for uniform distribution this condition
is equivalent to having 1TE−11 ≥ 12 . Finally, note that this holds because from (8.3) we
obtain 1TE−11 ≥ m− 12 ≥ 12 .
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Proof of Theorem 2
Throughput this proof we use the following notation for probability mass function of a
multinomial random variable:
Φ(k1, . . . , km;n; p1, . . . , pm) =
(
n
k1, . . . , km
)
(1− p1 − · · · − pm)n−k1−···−km
m−1∏
i=1
pkii ,
for all (k1, . . . , km) and (p1, . . . , pm) such that
∑m
i=1 ki ≤ n and
∑m
i=1 pi ≤ 1.
For a given price sequence p = (pT , . . . , p1) and a general distribution, using Corollary
1, the critical thresholds defining Buyers’ equilibrium satisfy
EA (F (vt+1)− F (vt)) = (pt−1 − pt)1, t = T, . . . , 2,
v1 − p11+ EA (1− F (v2)) = 0, (8.5)
with the convention that vT+1 = 1 where Fv(v) = (Fv(v
(1)), . . . , Fv(v
(m))). We will next
find the limiting normalized revenue for a given price sequence. The normalized revenue
is
1
n
1∑
t=T
ptE

 m∑
i=1
∑
j∈Gi
1{v(j) ∈ [v(i)t , v(i)t+1)}


=
∑
∑T
s=1 k
(s)
j ≤nj
j∈[m],s∈[T ]
m∏
j=1
Φ
(
k
(1)
j , . . . , k
(T )
j ;nj;Fv
(
v
(j)
1
)
− Fv
(
v
(j)
0
)
, . . . , Fv
(
v
(j)
T
)
− Fv
(
v
(j)
T−1
))
1
n

pT m∑
j=1
k
(T )
j + pT−1
m∑
j=1
k
(T−1)
j + · · ·+ p1
m∑
j=1
k
(1)
j

 , (8.6)
where by convention v
(j)
0 = 0 and the multinomial distribution captures the number of
possibilities for selecting a partition of [nj] into T + 1 subsets of size k
(1)
j , . . . , k
(T )
j , and
nj−k(1)j −· · ·−k(T )j . Note that for s = 1, . . . , T , k(s)j shows the number of buyers in block j
who buy at price ps and the remaining number of buyers in block j (i.e., nj−k(1)j −· · ·−k(T )j
many) decide not to buy the product. We rewrite Eq. (8.6) and take the limit as n→∞,
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resulting in
lim
n→∞
∑
∑T
s=1 k
(s)
j ≤nj
j∈{2,...,m−1},s∈[T ]
Φ
(
k
(1)
j , . . . , k
(T )
j ;nj;Fv
(
v
(j)
1
)
− Fv
(
v
(j)
0
)
, . . . , Fv
(
v
(j)
T
)
− Fv
(
v
(j)
T−1
))
× 1
n

pT m∑
j=2
k
(T )
j + pT−1
m∑
j=2
k
(T−1)
j + · · · + p1
m∑
j=2
k
(1)
j


×
∑
∑T
s=1 k
(s)
1 ≤n1
s∈[T ]
Φ
(
k
(1)
1 , . . . , k
(T )
1 ;n1;Fv
(
v
(1)
1
)
− Fv
(
v
(1)
0
)
, . . . , Fv
(
v
(1)
T
)
− Fv
(
v
(1)
T−1
))
× α1
n1
(
pTk
(T )
1 + pT−1k
(T−1)
1 + · · ·+ p1k(1)1
)
= lim
n→∞
∑
∑T
s=1 k
(s)
j ≤nj
j∈{2,...,m−1},s∈[T ]
m∏
j=2
Φ
(
k
(1)
j , . . . , k
(T )
j ;nj;Fv
(
v
(j)
1
)
− Fv
(
v
(j)
0
)
, . . . , Fv
(
v
(j)
T
)
− Fv
(
v
(j)
T−1
))
× 1
n

pT m∑
j=2
k
(T )
j + pT−1
m∑
j=2
k
(T−1)
j + · · · + p1
m∑
j=2
k
(1)
j


× α1
(
pT
(
1− Fv
(
v
(1)
T
))
+ pT−1
(
Fv
(
v
(1)
T
)
− Fv
(
v
(1)
T−1
))
+ · · ·+ p1
(
Fv
(
v
(1)
2
)
− Fv
(
v
(1)
1
)))
,
where we used Theorem 1 for n1 → ∞. Again using Theorem 1, m − 1 times for j =
2, . . . ,m as nj →∞, the normalized expected revenue becomes
pT
m∑
j=1
αj
(
1− Fv
(
v
(j)
T
))
+ · · ·+ p1
m∑
j=1
αj
(
Fv
(
v
(j)
2
)
− Fv
(
v
(j)
1
))
=
1∑
t=T
pt1
TA (Fv (vt+1)− Fv (vt)) ,
(8.7)
where we used the fact that 0 ≤ v1 ≤ v2 · · · ≤ vT ≤ 1 which guarantees Fv (vt+1) −
Fv (vt) ≥ 0 for all t = 1, . . . , T . At the end of this proof, we will show that Assumption
1 guarantees 0 ≤ v1 ≤ v2 · · · ≤ vT ≤ 1. Taking summation of Eq. (8.5) for t = 2, . . . , T
leads to
EA (1− Fv (v2)) = (p1 − pT )1.
Using this equation in Eq. (8.5) for t = 1 leads to v1 = pT1. Therefore, the normalized
revenue can be written as
1∑
t=T
pt1
TA (Fv (vt+1)− Fv (vt))
(1)
=
(
2∑
t=T
pt (pt−1 − pt)
(
1TE−11
))
+ p11
TA (Fv (v2)− Fv (v1))
=
(
2∑
t=T
pt
pt−1 − pt(
1
1TE−11
)
)
+ p11
TA
(
1− (EA)−1 1(p1 − pT )− Fv(pT )1
)
=
(
2∑
t=T
pt
pt−1 − pt(
1
1TE−11
)
)
+ p1
(
1
1TE−11
)
+ pT −
(
1
1TE−11
)
Fv(pT )− p1(
1
1TE−11
) , (8.8)
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where (1) follows from Eq. (8.5). Therefore, the monopolist’s problem is to choose p =
(pT , . . . , p1) that maximizes
h(p) =
(
2∑
t=T
pt
pt−1 − pt(
1
1TE−11
)
)
+ p1
(
1
1TE−11
)
+ pT −
(
1
1TE−11
)
Fv(pT )− p1(
1
1TE−11
) .
The first order conditions, results in
∂h
∂pT
= −2pT + pT−1 + p1 −
(
1
1TE−11
)
p1fv(pT ) = 0,
∂h
∂pt
= pt+1 − 2pt + pt−1 = 0, t = T − 1, . . . , 2,
∂h
∂p1
= p2 +
(
1
1TE−11
)
+ pT −
(
1
1TE−11
)
Fv(pT )− 2p1 = 0.
We will first find the solution of this set of equations and then show that with Assumption
1, the solution of first order conditions maximizes the revenue. Starting from the last
equation, we obtain
p2 = 2p1 −
((
1
1TE−11
)
+ pT −
(
1
1TE−11
)
Fv(pT )
)
.
Plugging this into the equation corresponding to ∂h
∂p2
= 0, leads to
p3 = 3p1 − 2
((
1
1TE−11
)
+ pT −
(
1
1TE−11
)
Fv(pT )
)
.
Repeating this argument leads to
pt = tp1 − (t− 1)
((
1
1TE−11
)
+ pT −
(
1
1TE−11
)
Fv(pT )
)
, t = 1, . . . , T. (8.9)
Using Eq. (8.9) for t = T and the equation corresponding to ∂h
∂pT
= 0 yields
pT = Tp1 − (T − 1)
((
1
1TE−11
)
+ pT −
(
1
1TE−11
)
Fv(pT )
)
. (8.10)
Moreover, using Eq. (8.9) for t = T − 1 in the equation corresponding to ∂h
∂pT
= 0, gives
− 2pT +
(
(T − 1)p1 − (T − 2)
((
1
1TE−11
)
+ pT −
(
1
1TE−11
)
Fv(pT )
))
+ p1 −
(
1
1TE−11
)
p1fv(pT ) = 0. (8.11)
Combining Eq. (8.10) and Eq. (8.11), we find the price in the first and last periods as
pT = (1− Fv(pT ))
(
1
fv(pT )
− T − 1
T (1TE−11)
)
,
p1 =
1− Fv(pT )
fv(pT )
= (T − 1) 1− Fv(pT )
T (1TE−11)
+ pT . (8.12)
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Invoking Eq. (8.12) in Eq. (8.9) results in the optimal price sequence
pt = (T − t) 1− Fv(pT )
T (1TE−11)
+ pT , t = 1, . . . , T. (8.13)
Therefore, the price sequence starts from pT in the first periods and linearly increases.
Also, note that the price pT given by the solution of Eq. (8.12) is unique. We show this
by establishing that
1− 1− F (x)
f(x)
+
T − 1
T
1
1TE−11
(1− F (x))
is increasing. Taking derivative of this equation leads to
1−
(
1− F (x)
f(x)
)′
− T − 1
T
f(x)
1TE−11
≥ 1−
(
1− F (x)
f(x)
)′
− f(x)
1TE−11
≥ 0,
where we used Assumption 1 in the last inequality.
We next show that the first order condition gives the optimal price sequence. The
Hessian of h(·) is given by a symmetric matrix M where Mii = −2 for i = 1, . . . , T − 1,
MTT = −2 −
(
1/1TE−11
)
p1f
′
v(pT ), Mi,i+1 = 1, for i = 1, . . . , T − 1, and M1T = 1 −(
1/1TE−11
)
fv(pT ). We next show that the Hessian is negative semidefinite. For any
x ∈ RT , we show that xTMx ≥ 0. We have
xTMx = −2
T−1∑
i=1
x2i − (2 +
(
1
1TE−11
)
p1f
′
v(pT ))x
2
T + 2
T−1∑
i=1
xixi+1 + 2
(
1−
(
1
1TE−11
)
fv(pT )
)
x1xT
(1)
≤ −x21 − x2T
(
1 +
p1f
′(pT )
1TE−11
)
+ 2
(
1−
(
1
1TE−11
)
fv(pT )
)
x1xT
(2)
= −x21 − x2T
(
1 +
(1− F (pT )) f ′(pT )
f(pT )1TE−11
)
+ 2
(
1−
(
1
1TE−11
)
fv(pT )
)
x1xT ,
(8.14)
where (1) follows from a2 + b2 ≥ 2ab and (2) follows from Eq. (8.12). In order to show
Eq. (8.14) is non-positive it suffices to show that the matrix
N =
(
−1 1− f(pT )
1TE−11
1− f(pT )
1TE−11
−
(
1 + (1−F (pT ))f
′(pT )
f(pT )1TE−11
))
is negative semidefinite. Since N11 < 0, in order to show N is negative semidefinite, it
suffices to show the determinant is non-negative. The determinant is
det(N) = f(pT )
(
1− f(pT )
1TE−11
−
(
1− F (pT )
f(pT )
)′)
≥ 0,
where we used Assumption 1 to obtain the inequality.
To complete the proof, it remains to verify 0 ≤ v1 ≤ v2 · · · ≤ vT ≤ 1. This holds
because using Eq. (8.5), we obtain
F (vt+1)− F (vt) = A−1E−11(pt−1 − pt) ≥ 0, t = T, . . . , 2, (8.15)
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where the inequality holds because pt−1 ≥ pt and from Assumption 1, we have (EA)−11 ≥
0. Therefore, we have v2 ≤ v3 · · · ≤ vT ≤ 1. We will next show that v2 ≥ v1 ≥ 0.
Inequality v1 ≥ 0 evidently holds as we have v1 = pT1 ≥ 0. Also, v2 ≥ v1 is equivalent to
Fv (v1) = Fv (pT )1 ≤ 1− (EA)−1 1 (p1 − pT ) = Fv (v2) . (8.16)
This holds because we have
(EA)−1 1 (p1 − pT ) (1)= (EA)−1 1
(
1− Fv(pT )
fv(pT )
− pT
)
(2)
= (1− Fv(pT )) (EA)−1 1 T − 1
T (1TE−11)
(3)
≤ (1− Fv(pT ))1,
where (1) follows from p1 =
1−Fv(pT )
fv(pT )
, (2) follows from pT = (1− Fv(pT ))
(
1
fv(pT )
− T−1
T (1TE−11)
)
,
and (3) follows from Assumption 1 and in particular (EA)−1 1 1
1TE−11
≤ 1 ≤ T
T−11. We
next find the corresponding optimal normalized revenue. Plugging price sequence Eq.
(8.13) in Eq. (8.8) leads to the optimal normalized revenue
2∑
t=T
(
(T − t) 1− Fv(pT )
T (1TE−11)
+ pT
)
1− Fv(pT )
T (1TE−11)
(
1TE−11
)
+
(
(T − 1) 1− Fv(pT )
T (1TE−11)
+ pT
) ( 1
1TE−11
)
+ pT −
(
1
1TE−11
)
Fv(pT )−
(
(T − 1) 1−Fv(pT )
T (1TE−11)
+ pT
)
(
1
1TE−11
)
= (1− Fv(pT ))
(
T − 1
2T
1
1TE−11
(1− Fv(pT )) + pT
)
.
Proof of Proposition 2
Using Theorem 2, the optimal normalized revenue is
pT (1− Fv(pT )) + T − 1
2T
1
1TE−11
(1− Fv(pT ))2 , (8.17)
where
pT = (1− Fv(pT ))
(
1
fv(pT )
− T − 1
T
1
1TE−11
)
. (8.18)
We next take the derivative of Eq. 8.17 with respect to y = T−1
T
1
1TE−11
and show that
it is positive, implying that the optimal normalized revenue is increasing in both Ψ(E) =
1
1TE−11
and T . Taking derivative of Eq. 8.17 with respect to y leads to
d
dy
(
pT (1− Fv(pT )) + y
2
(1− Fv(pT ))2
)
=
dpT
dy
(1− F (pT ))
(
−2 + yf(pT )− (1− F (pT ))f
′(pT )
f2(pT )
)
− 1
2
(1− F (pT ))2. (8.19)
Also, taking derivative of Eq. (8.18) with respect to y yields
dpT
dy
= − (1− F (pT ))
2− f(pT )y + 1−F (pT )f ′(pT )f2(pT )
. (8.20)
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Plugging Eq. (8.20) into Eq. (8.19) gives
d
dy
(
pT (1− Fv(pT )) + y
2
(1− Fv(pT ))2
)
=
1
2
(1− F (pT ))2 ≥ 0.
Therefore, the optimal normalized revenue in increasing in y. Since y = T
T−1Ψ(E) is
increasing in both T and Ψ(E), the optimal normalized revenue is increasing in both T
and Ψ(E).
The second derivative of the optimal normalized revenue with respect to y is
d
dy
1
2
(1− F (pT ))2 = −(1− F (pT ))f(pT )dpT
dy
= f(pT )
(1− F (pT ))2
2− f(pT )y + (1−F (pT ))f ′(pT )f2(pT )
≥ 0,
where we used Assumption 1 in the inequality. Since y is linear in Ψ(E) (i.e., y =
T−1
T
Ψ(E)), the optimal normalized revenue is convex in Ψ(E).
The slope of the optimal price sequence is (1−F (pT ))Ψ(E)T . We next take the derivative
of the slope with respect to Ψ(E) and show it is non-negative. We have
d
dΨ(E)
(
(1− F (pT ))Ψ(E)
T
)
=
1− F (pT )
T
− Ψ(E)
T
f(pT )
dpT
dy
dy
dΨ(E)
=
1− F (pT )
T
− Ψ(E)
T
f(pT )
−(1− F (pT ))2
2− f(pT )y + (1−F (pT ))f ′(pT )f2(pT )
T
T − 1
=
1− F (pT )
T
+
Ψ(E)
T
f(pT )
(1− F (pT ))2
2− f(pT )y + (1−F (pT ))f ′(pT )f2(pT )
T
T − 1 ≥ 0,
where we used Assumption 1 in the inequality. Therefore, the slope of the optimal price
sequence is increasing in Ψ(E).
Proof of Proposition 3
First note that given the in-degree sequence, we have 1TC1 = 1T C˜1 =
∑m
i=1 d
(in)
i . We
next compare the terms 1TC21 and 1T C˜21. Since the imbalance sequence of C majorizes
the imbalance sequence of C˜, we have
j∑
i=1
c˜
(out)
i ≥
j∑
i=1
c
(out)
i , ∀j = 1, . . . ,m. (8.21)
Using Eq. (8.21) for j = m, yields
d(in)m
m∑
i=1
(c
(out)
i − c˜(out)i ) ≤ 0.
Again, using Eq. (8.21) for j = m− 1 and the previous inequality we obtain
d(in)m (c
(out)
m − c˜(out)m ) + d(in)m−1
m−1∑
i=1
(c
(out)
i − c˜(out)i ) ≤ d(in)m
m∑
i=1
(c
(out)
i − c˜(out)i ) ≤ 0,
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where we used
∑m=1
i=1 (c
(out)
i − c˜(out)i ) ≤ 0 and d(in)m−1 ≥ d(in)m . Repeating this argument, leads
to
m∑
i=1
d
(in)
i (c
(out)
i − c˜(out)i ) ≤ 0,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
Similar to the proof of Theorem 2 the critical thresholds defining the buyers’ equilibrium
satisfy
EA(vt+1 − vt) = pt−1 − pt, t = T, . . . , 2,
v1 − p1 + EA(1− v2) = 0, (8.22)
and the normalized revenue becomes
h(p) ,
1∑
t=T
pTt A (vt+1 − vt) =
(
2∑
t=T
pTt E
−1 (pt−1 − pt)
)
+ pT1A (1− pT )− pT1 E−1 (p1 − pT ) .
(8.23)
Taking derivative of the revenue and multiplying by E leads to
E
∂h
∂pT
= pT−1 − 2pT − EAp1 + p1 = 0,
E
∂h
∂pt
= pt+1 − 2pt + pt−1 = 0, t = T − 1, . . . , 2,
E
∂h
∂p1
= p2 + EA1− EApT − 2p1 + pT = 0.
Similar to the argument used in the proof of Theorem 2, the optimal price sequence
becomes
pt = (T − t)x+ pT , t = T, . . . , 1. (8.24)
Plugging this into the equation corresponding to ∂h
∂p1
= 0, we obtain
x =
1
T
EA (1− pT ) . (8.25)
Finally, using (8.25) in the equation corresponding to ∂h
∂pT
= 0, leads to pT given by
EA1 =
(
I +
(
I − T − 1
T
EA
)−1)
EApT .
This equation simplifies to
pT =
(
I +
(
I − T − 1
T
EA
)−1)−1
1. (8.26)
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Plugging Eq. (8.26) in Eq. (8.25) leads to
x =
1
T
EA (1− pT ) = 1
T − 1
(
2T
T − 1 (EA)
−1 − I
)−1
,
which gives the optimal price sequence given in the statement of Theorem 4. We next
show that the first order condition provides the optimal solution. To this end, we show
that the Hessian is negative semidefinite. The Hessian is given by

−2I I 0 . . . I − EA
I −2I I . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . I −2I I
I − EA 0 . . . I −2I

 .
We need to show that for any x1, . . . ,xT ∈ Rm we have
−2
m∑
i=1
xTi Ixi +
∑
i 6=j
xTi Ixj − 2xT1 EAxT ≤ 0.
This follows by taking summation of the following inequalities:
1
2
xTi Ix
T
i +
1
2
xTi+1Ix
T
i+1 ≥ xiIxi+1, i = 1, . . . , T − 1,
1
2
xTT (I − EA)xTT +
1
2
xTT (I − EA)xTT ≥ x1(I −EA)xT
1
2
xTTEAx
T
T +
1
2
xTTEAx
T
T ≥ 0,
where the first and last set of inequalities evidently hold and the second inequality follows
from the assumption that I −EA is positive semidefinite. Finally, note that since I −EA
is positive semidefinite, I − EAT−1
T
is invertible.
We will next show that the critical thresholds are interior. By Assumption we have(
I +
(
I − T−1
T
EA
)−1)−1
1 ≤ 1, showing pt−1 ≥ pt for t = T, . . . , 2. Therefore, using Eq.
(8.22), we obtain 1 ≥ vT ≥ · · · ≥ v2. We will next show v2 ≥ v1 ≥ 0. Since v1 = pT and(
I +
(
I − T−1
T
EA
)−1)−1
1 ≥ 0, we obtain v1 ≥ 0. We next show that v2 ≥ v1. Using
Eq. (8.22), we have
v1 = pT ≤ 1− (EA)−1T − 1
T
(EA)(1 − pT ) ≤ 1− (EA)−1(p1 − pT ) = v2,
where the first inequality evidently holds and the second inequality follows from Eqs. (8.24)
and (8.25). Finally, using the Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury formula Horn and Johnson
(2012, Section 0.7.4) stated at the end of this proof, we can simplify Eq. 8.26 as follows(
I +
(
I − T − 1
T
EA
)−1)−1
1 =
1
2
1− 1
2
T − 1
T
E
(
I − 1
2
T − 1
T
EA
)−1 A1
2
.
Lemma 3 (Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury) Suppose that a nonsingular matrix A ∈
R
n×n has a known inverse A−1 and consider B = A +XR−1Y ,in which X is n-by-r, Y
is r-by-n, and R is r-by-r and nonsingular. If B is nonsingular, then
B−1 = A−1 −A−1X(R + Y A−1X)−1Y A−1.
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8.1 Model with Utility from all Purchases
In this subsection, we consider a variation of our model in which the utility of a buyer
depends on the entire set of buyers who buy the product over T periods. More specifically,
the utility of buyer i is
v(i) − pt +
∑
j 6=i
gij1{j buys at s ∈ {1, . . . , T}},
where v(i) is the valuation of buyer i and pt is the posted price at round t. We assume
that customers are individually rational, i.e., if a customer purchases at round t, her
utility considering only the purchases already happened, should be non-negative. This
assumption is crucial as without this assumption given any price sequence all customers
purchase the item at the round with minimum price. We next show via an example that
in this setting the optimal price sequence can either be increasing or decreasing.
Example 3 Let the valuations be uniform over [0, 1], n = 2, and g12 = g21 = g ≤ 1.
We first find the optimal non-decreasing price sequence and then find the optimal non-
increasing price sequence.
• Non-decreasing price sequence (i.e. p2 ≤ p1): the optimal prices are p2 = p1 = 1/2
with revenue 1+g2 . The seller’s problem becomes
max
p2≤p1
2(1− p2)2p2 + 2p2(1− p2)
(
p2 + p1P[0,1]
(
1− p1 − g
p2
))
,
where the first term of the objective captures the case when both valuations are
above p2 which happens with probability (1− p2)2 with corresponding revenue 2p2.
The second term captures the case when only one of the valuations is above p2
whose probability is 2p2(1 − p2). In this case, the monopolist obtains revenue p2
from the buyer with valuation above p2. The other buyer purchases if its valuation
is above p1 − g whose probability is P[0,1]
(
1− p1−g
p2
)
(i.e., P [v ≥ p1 − g | v ≤ p2])
and its revenue is p1. Also, note that if both valuations are below p2, then none of
the buyers purchases the product in the first period. Therefore, they generate no
network effect and none of them will purchase in the second period with price p1
which is higher than p2. The solution to this optimization problem is p1 = p2 =
1
2 .
• Non-increasing price sequence (i.e., p2 ≥ p1): note that in this case customers may
postpone the purchase even if their utility is non-negative in order to pay the lower
price offered in the subsequent period. If a buyer with valuation v ≥ p2 buys in the
first period her expected utility becomes
v − p2 + g(1 − (p1 − g)), (8.27)
where the term (1− (p1 − g)) is the probability of the other customer purchasing in
one of the periods. On the other hand, if a buyer with valuation v ≥ p2 buys in the
second period her expected utility becomes
v − p1 + g(1 − p1), (8.28)
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where the term (1 − p1) is the probability of the other customer purchasing in one
of the periods. Comparing Eqs. (8.27) and (8.28), a buyer with valuation v ≥ p2
purchases in the first period if and only if
v − p2 + g(1− p1 + g) ≥ v − p1 + g(1− p1),
which leads to g2 ≥ p2 − p1. If the prices does not satisfy this inequality, then both
buyers purchase in the second period with price p1 (i.e., lower price) and the optimal
expected revenue becomes 2(1− p1)p1 ≤ 12 . We next consider a price sequence that
satisfies g2 ≥ p2 − p1 and show the optimal expected revenue is always higher than
1
2 . In this case, the seller’s problem becomes
max
p2≥p1
2(1− p2)2p2 + 2p2(1− p2)
(
P[0,1]
(
1− p1 − g
p2
)
p1 + p2
)
+ p22
(
2p1
(
1− p1
p2
))
s.t. g2 ≥ p2 − p1,
where the first term of the objective captures the case when both valuations are
above p2 which happens with probability (1− p2)2 with corresponding revenue 2p2.
The second term captures the case when only one of the valuations is above p2
whose probability is 2p2(1 − p2). In this case, the monopolist obtains revenue p2
from the buyer with valuation above p2. The other buyer purchases if its valuation
is above p1 − g whose probability is P[0,1]
(
1− p1−g
p2
)
(i.e., P [v ≥ p1 − g | v ≤ p2])
and its revenue is p1. The third terms of the objective captures the case when both
valuations are below p2. In this case, each player purchase in the second period with
probability 1 − p1
p2
and obtains revenue p1 from each purchase. The solution of this
problem is:
1. If g ≥ 12 , the optimal price sequence is p1 = 12 , p2 = 58 with the optimal revenue
25
32 .
2. If
√
13−1
6 ≤ g < 12 , the optimal price sequence is p1 = g, p2 = 1+g−g
2
2 , with the
optimal revenue
(1+g−g2)2
2 .
3. If
√
2− 1 ≤ g <
√
13−1
6 , the optimal price sequence is p1 = g, p2 =
g(g+1)
2 , with
the optimal revenue 2g
(
1 + g − 2g2 − 2g3).
4. If g <
√
2 − 1, , the optimal price sequence is p1 = 1−g22 , p2 = 1+g
2
2 , with the
optimal revenue 12
(
1 + g + 2g2 − 2g3 − 3g4 + g5).
Putting these two cases together the optimal revenue becomes the one plotted in Figure 4.
In Example 3, the optimal price sequence can be decreasing because a buyer who observes
a lower price in the second period might be willing to purchase in the first period (with
higher price) in order to incentivize the other buyer to purchase in the second period. This
effect goes away once we consider a large number of buyers for which a similar argument
to that of Proposition 1 shows that the optimal price sequence is non-decreasing. In the
next proposition we characterize the optimal price sequence (which is non-decreasing).
Proposition 5 Suppose the valuations are uniform and ||EA||∞ < 1. The optimal price
sequence in the limit (as n → ∞) is pt = 12 , t = T, . . . , 1 with the optimal normalized
revenue
1
4
1TA
(
I + (EA) + (EA)2 + · · · + (EA)T−1)1.
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Figure 4: In a model with utility from all sales, the optimal price sequence can either be
increasing or decreasing. This figure illustrates the optimal revenue for both increasing
and decreasing price sequences for the setting described in Example 3.
Note that similar to Lemma 2 for a weakly-tied block model E = I + δC and small
enough δ, the Assumption of Proposition 5 holds, i.e., ||EA||∞ < 1.
Proposition 5 implies the following:
• The optimal revenue increases as the entries of the weighted network effects EA
increases.
• Since ρ(EA) ≤ ||EA||∞ < 1, the limiting revenue as T →∞ becomes (see Horn and Johnson
(2012, Chapter 5))
1
4
1TA(I − EA)−11.
• For a weakly-tied block model E = I + δC and small enough δ, we have ρ(EA) < 1
and the first order Taylor series of 141
TA(I − EA)−11 leads to
1
4
m∑
i=1
αi
1− αi + δ
1
4
m∑
i,j=1
αi
1− αi
αj
1− αjCij.
This shows that revenue becomes higher as the weighted summation of network
externalities Cij increases, where the weights are given by
αi
1−αi
αj
1−αj . This establishes
that revenue is higher when we have higher externality among blocks with higher
sizes.
Proof of Proposition 5
The critical thresholds defining the buyers’ equilibrium satisfy
vt − pt1+ EA(1− vt+1) = 0, t = 1, . . . , T, (8.29)
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with the convention that vT+1 = 1. Eq. (8.29) leads to
vT+1 − vT = (1− pT )1
vT − vT−1 = pT1− pT−11+ (EA)1(1 − pT )
vT−1 − vT−2 = pT−11− pT−21+ (EA)1(pT − pT−1) + (EA)21(1− pT )
vT+1−t − vT−t =
t∑
s=0
(
(EA)t−s1
)
(pT+1−s − pT−s), t = 3, . . . , T − 1, (8.30)
with the convention pT+1 = 1. The normalized revenue can be written as
T∑
t=1
ptα
T (vt+1 − vt) (8.31)
which we need to maximize over non-decreasing price sequences, i.e., pT ≤ · · · ≤ p2 ≤ p1.
We show that the optimal solution is pt =
1
2 , t = 1, . . . , T . We establish this by using the
sufficient KKT conditions for optimality (Bertsekas (1999, Proposition 3.3.2)). Following
the notations used in Bertsekas (1999), we let
p = (pT , . . . , p1),
fv(p) = −
T∑
t=1
ptα
T (vt+1 − vt),
gj(p) = pj+1 − pj, j = 1, . . . , T − 1,
L(p, µ) = fv(p) +
T−1∑
j=1
µjgj(p).
With this notation, the optimization problem can be rewritten as
min
p
fv(p)
s.t. g(p) ≤ 0.
Letting p∗ = 121 and
µ∗j =
1
2
T−j∑
s=1
((αT (EA)s−11)− ((αT (EA)T−s1)), j = 1, . . . , T − 1,
we have
∇pL(p∗, µ∗) = 0 (8.32)
gj(p
∗) ≤ 0, j = 1, . . . , T − 1 (8.33)
µ∗j (p
∗
j+1 − p∗j) = 0, j = 1, . . . , T − 1 (8.34)
µ∗j > 0,∀j, s.t. p∗j+1 − p∗j = 0, j = 1, . . . , T − 1 (8.35)
yT∇ppL(p∗, µ∗)y > 0,∀y 6= 0 s.t. ∇gj(p)Ty = 0,∀j, s.t. p∗j+1 − p∗j = 0. (8.36)
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In particular, Eq. (8.32) and Eq. (8.33) are straightforward to verify, Eq. (8.34) holds as
all inequalities are active and Eq. (8.35) holds because we have
µ∗j =
(
1− αT (EA)j1) T−1−j∑
s=0
αT (EA)s1 ≥ (1− ||(EA)j ||∞)
T−1−j∑
s=0
αT (EA)s1
≥ (1− ||(EA)||j∞)
T−1−j∑
s=0
αT (EA)s1 > 0,
where we used ||EA||∞ < 1 in the last inequality. Finally, Eq. (8.36) holds because all
y ∈ RT−1 that satisfy the conditions are of the form y1 for some non-zero y ∈ R for which
yT∇ppL(p∗, µ∗)y = y2
T∑
i,j=1
∇ppL(p∗, µ∗) = 2y2
T∑
t=1
αT (EA)t−11 > 0.
Therefore, using Bertsekas (1999, Proposition 3.3.2), pt =
1
2 , t = 1, . . . , T is the optimal
price sequence which results in revenue
1
4
1TA
(
I + (EA) + (EA)2 + · · · + (EA)T−1)1.
Finally, note that with price sequence pt =
1
2 for t = 1, . . . , T , Eq. (8.30) results in
1 ≥ vT ≥ · · · ≥ v1 ≥ 0, showing that the critical thresholds are in [0, 1].
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